Walker's SCATHING INDICTMENT - Part 5 of 6 - Trial Two

This is my synopsized prose version of Justice Walker's 140-page judgement presented in several segments that reveal the substance of Walker's overview of evidence that demanded his verdict against the Ministry of Children's Child Protection. No stated opinion or fact appears here that does not also appear in the Justice Walker's ruling (legal document). It is public information

In Trial Two the plaintiffs sought damages based on the tort of misfeasance, alleging intentional and reckless misconduct by the Director and her agents acting in breach of the standard of care as well as fiduciary duty, being motivated by bad faith and malice. The same claim for costs was made at first trial but put over to the second trial. More specifically in Trail Two plaintiffs claimed that the Director and her agents failed to protect the children from B.G.; failed to investigate reports of sexual and physical abuse; wrongfully apprehended the children from their mother; unreasonably held the unjustifiable belief that J.P. was unfit to parent; ignored Court orders; abandoned statutory obligations. The result has been ongoing emotional harm to the children from abuse by B.G. and from being withheld from their mother for two and one-half years. Further, while in the care of the Director the youngest child, P.G. was sexually abused because of the unsupervised access.  

In Justice Walker's Second Trial judgement, for ease of reference, he referred to the Director and her agents as the “Director”. The Director and the Ministry cannot be sued. Therefore, the defendant was the Province of British Columbia since the Province is responsible for the Director and the Ministry. The Province denied any basis for a finding of misfeasance, asserting that the Director fulfilled all common law and statutory duties to the children. B.G. denied all claims against him.  Judge Walker in his ruling certainly disagreed. He determined that the infant plaintiffs established the liability of the Province for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty owed to them. The plaintiffs, including J.P., also proved the misfeasance claim. Judge Walker determined that the Director and certain Ministry social workers acted well outside of their statutory mandate and the duty to protect children and that the nature of their libelous handling of the case varied depending on the individual. It ranged from intentional misconduct, bad faith, reckless disregard for their obligation to protect children, breach of the applicable standard of care to unreasonably supporting the custodial interests of the children’s father even if it meant he sexually abused them.